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By way of introduction 
 
t is not uncommon for a treatment of rights to be treatment against power 
with some concession to the responsibilities that a tutelary of rights enjoys.  
We owe it to legal philosophers of the Scholastic persuasion who 
recognized rights as the entitlements that allow a person to fulfill duties—
whether these arise from nature or from contract.  In this sense rights were 
subordinate to and enjoyed for the sake of duties that one had.  One may 
debate this way of putting things, but it had the marked advantage of clarity 
and showed the internal connection between rights and duties.  Also in the 
scholastic anatomy of rights, there was such a thing as the “term” of the 
right—he against whom the right could be claimed, and therefore he or she 
upon whom a duty was incumbent to desist from transgressing the right of the 
tutelary.  In this sense a “right to” was concomitantly “power against,” but 
power, in the sense of claim or entitlement.  For the power to enforce, one had 
to look to what scholastic philosophers called the “title” of the right—and this 
could be natural law, positive law that, of course, included contracts. 
I do not think that this was bad at all, but I would like to pick up the 
subject today by paying attention to two leading figures: Paul Ricoeur and 
Jürgen Habermas. 
 
Ricoeur 
 
  It is said with good reason that Ricoeur’s focus, in his later works, was 
the “capable person.”  But as acting and speaking, a person is also subject to 
precepts.  He is accessible to precepts.  The vexatious dichotomy between 
“ought” and “is” therefore does not arise, for Ricoeur, in respect to the person, 
because the very “is” of his actions comes with the “ought” of precepts.2   
Admitting that there is no philosophical necessity for distinguishing 
between ethics and morals, he nevertheless introduces an ad hoc distinction.  
                                                 
1 This paper was read at the 2008 Annual Philosophy Day Conference sponsored by 
the UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines held at the Ateneo de Manila University 
on November 20, 2008.  
2 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 
169. 
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2     THE DIALECTICS OF POWER 
Ethics refers to the aim of an accomplished life, and morality, the articulation 
of this aim in norms characterized by the claim of universality and by an effect 
of constraint.  And the ethical intention is “aiming at the good life with and for 
others in just institutions. 
Now practice, whether it be the practice of a profession, of an art or 
of conduct is unified by the dimension of meaning in which it makes sense to 
evaluate, and therefore to refer to norms and to the precepts of doing 
something.  Writing this paper is reading books, writing lines, re-writing them, 
exchanging views with others—all of which have meaning because of the 
standard of a philosophy paper by which one can evaluate whether it is a 
carefully thought out paper or not.  Standards, however, are never the fruit of 
the ruminations of the solitary actor, performer or agent, but of a community 
or society of practitioners.3 
From this level of appreciating the capable person, it is clear that basic 
power is the power to evaluate both his own actions and those of others in 
accordance with the standards of excellence that serve as constitutive rules.  In 
another work, Ricoeur asks more directly about the “subject of rights.”  This 
ethical question culminates in the proposition of philosophical anthropology 
that the subject of rights is the capable subject who is capable of assignment, 
by which he means the capacity of the human subject to designate himself as 
author of the acts.  And we are worthy of esteem and respect—which is a way 
of talking about our rights—insofar as we are able to esteem as good or bad, 
declare as permitted or forbidden, actions of others or of ourselves.  A subject 
of imputation therefore results from the reflexive application to agents of the 
predicates like “good” or “obligatory.”4   
The persons’ basic power—his capacity for assignment (or 
assignation) is his power to esteem, and therefore also his entitlement also to 
esteem and respect.  On this level, the capable person’s power is at the basis of 
his rights, but this is not the power to claim rights, nor to enforce them against 
others, but principally the power to use the qualifiers good or bad in respect to 
his own actions and those of others, at the same time as he attributes or assigns 
these actions to himself. 
But still following the development of Ricoeur’s ethics, we meet with 
another, though not unrelated, face of power: The power to engage in praxis 
whose teleology he can nest within his greater life-plan.  Obviously, power can 
be visited upon a person to engage in praxis that resists coherent integration 
into his life-plan, and that constitutes the basic violation of the human person.5 
So what is the good life?  It is the nebulous of ideals and dreams of 
achievement with regard to which a life is held to be more or less fulfilled or 
unfulfilled.  It is that in view of which all actions are directed, though these 
actions may have ends in themselves.   Getting to meet you and discuss power 
and rights with you today is an end in itself, but to deal with the good life, this 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 176. 
4 Paul Ricoeur, The Just (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 3-4. 
5 Ricouer, Oneself as Another, 179.   
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finality must somehow be orientated towards what I take—never monadically 
of course—to be a fulfilled life.   
There must perforce be constant reference back to our notions of the 
good life in commencing that praxis that may have end in itself, just as take the 
cue for actions in which we engage from our notion of the good life.  Life-
plans and praxis are therefore to be interpreted by constant reference to each 
other.  Action is therefore interpreted, and the person who interprets his 
actions must in the same measure interpret himself. 
Solicitude is Ricoeur’s term for the good life with and for others.  It is 
not an added moment to self-esteem but is essential to it.  The path to mine-
ness (esteem for myself) traverses the unexpressed reference to the other.  To 
esteem what I have written is to be confident that an exchange with you can 
only be fruitful, not threatening. 
Life can be good only with friends.  Hence at the heart of the aim at 
the good life is a “lack”: we need friends, and “need” not be a term of 
utilitarian monopoly.  In fact, Ricoeur puts it very well: “Need has to do not 
only with that which is active and incomplete in living together but also with 
the sort of shortage or lack belonging to the very relation of the self to its own 
existence.”  There is lack therefore that dwells in the most solid of friendships.6 
Ricoeur makes the very pointed observation that in many languages, 
goodness is the ethical quality of the aims of action and the orientation of the 
person towards others.  An action is not held as good unless it is done on 
behalf of others, where mabuti bears reference not only to what a person does, 
but to what he does in behalf of others, or for the sake of others, thus 
distinguishing  mabuti  from  mahusay  or  magaling.  Solicitude is benevolent 
spontaneity.  I adjudge care and concern for others good, and myself as good 
insofar as I am truly solicitous.7 
For Levinas, the Other appears as the master of justice, the preceptor 
of the right, the embodied prohibition against murder.  The Otherness of the 
other precisely defines exteriority and thus excludes relation.  This asymmetry 
is compensated by benevolence, through the movement of recognition.  But 
the inverse situation is also the appearance of the other in suffering: suffering 
will not be confined to physical pain, or even mental pain, but by reduction 
even the destruction of the capacity for acting, for being able to act, 
experienced as a violation of self-integrity.   
This gives us the negative side of power: It is within my power to 
cause the other to suffer, principally in violating the other’s self-integrity.  The 
exercise of this kind of destructive power, which I shall call violence, is the 
very negation of the right of the other, which I also understand as the 
magisterial or instructive position of the other.  It is the antithesis of the 
benevolent spontaneity that is solicitude. 
But this also allows us into another important dimension of the power 
of the human person: the power to receive the pain and anguish, the suffering 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 181-186. 
7 Ibid., 190.  
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and distress of the one who has less power (or is even powerless).  It is the 
capacity of sympathy which is the heightened for of the capacity for solicitude.  
In this regard, all effort to balance talk of power and rights with attention to 
responsibilities is superfluous.  The power that we here encounter is the power 
of responsibility—in the sense of responding not with pity but with sympathy 
to the plight of the other.  It is the power for the subservience of power to the 
weakened condition of the other. 
Once more, however, we must advert to the execrable form of the use 
of power—and that is when power is directed against the power of the 
solicitous and sympathetic person. The most dramatic examples of this terrible 
brutalizing use of power come to us from those movie clips of Nazi prisoners 
tasked to dig the graves of their own relatives and friends and to toss them 
nonchalantly like garbage into a common pit, or to shove them into a 
crematorium.  The power each of those hapless prisoners had to sympathize 
with the victims—totally stripped of all power—was suppressed, stifled, 
shacked by the overpowering power of brute force or strategic advantage and 
superiority, so that one just dug, picked up bodies, even if they were the bodies 
of loved ones once cuddled and caressed, without any emotion.  This is the 
power directed against the very heart of the ethical, and therefore the most 
unethical use of power, but it is the power that attempts at canceling solicitude 
and sympathy that are at the very heart of the aspiration to live a good life with 
others.  
Between the extremes of summons by the Other from a magisterial 
height that always excludes relations (Levinas) and the spontaneity of sympathy 
at the immense suffering of the other is friendship where the self and the other 
wish to share the same life together.  The presupposed equality of friendships 
is re-established by the acknowledgment of the superiority of the other who 
calls, and in sympathy, by shared agony, vulnerability and fragility.  To self-
esteem in its reflexive moment friendship adds the dimension of lack—we 
need friends, and a sense of equality: I am, with friends, an equal to them.8 
The recognition of right must of necessity be part of the ethical 
moment, because the consequence of the denial of rights is the denial of 
equality.  While it is true that there is something aristocratic about friendship (it 
does not extend to all), to wish for the good life with others cannot mean 
excluding the others from the good life, or excluding anyone a priori from the 
circle of friends form whom I am solicitous.  Responsibility is my susceptibility 
to summons; it is at the same time the essence of solicitude that must first of 
all recognize the equality of the other, my equality with him, and thus a basic 
recognition of right.  The misuse or abuse of power is precisely the perversion 
of sympathy because it exploits the vulnerability of the other, where sympathy 
shares in weakness and anguish. 
The last item in Ricoeur’s analysis is “just institutions,” for the 
transformation of the veritable subject of rights into an actual subject of rights 
does not take place without the mediation of the Other, and the other is not 
                                                 
8 Ricouer, Oneself as Another, 192.  
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encountered only in the dialogical and in the intimate, but also in the 
anonymity of the third person.  Interpersonal relations do not exhaust the 
whole gamut of living together that will include communities, societies, 
nations.9   
There is a will to live together.  The ethical aim includes this will.  
“The golod life in unjust institutions” is incomprehensible.  It is incoherent. 
Ricoeur borrows from Arendt the notion of “power in common” to deal with 
plurality which extends to all others whom I do not encounter face to face and 
are therefore third persons.  A plea for the anonymous is therefore part of the 
ethical life. 
For Arendt, the space of appearance comes into being whenever 
persons are together in the manner of speech and action.  This space is prior to 
the state, prior to organized polity.  It exists for as long as persons are together 
and act together; it ceases when they disperse.10  Political communities are 
killed first by loss of power and then impotence.  Power is never stored up so 
that it may tapped in times of crises.  There is no such thing as stored power, 
only power in actu.  It exists only in its exercise, in its actualization.  “Power is 
actualized only where word and deed have not parted company, where words 
are not empty and deeds are not brutal, where words are not used to veil 
intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and 
destroy, but to establish relation and create new realities.”11 
Arendt therefore contrasts power and force.  Force is that which is 
employed by those who have cornered the means of violence (despots, 
aristocrats, even rebel groups as well as the lords of society’s netherworlds) for 
themselves.  While violence can destroy power, it can never substitute for it.  
So it is that there then can co-exist force and powerlessness, the impotent 
spent force of futile impositions.  Arendt therefore reaches a spectacular 
conclusion, inspired, she admits by Montesquieu: Tyranny is not a form of 
government but the very antithesis of plurality, because the tyrant thrives by 
isolating himself from the people and by isolating people from each other.  
Tyranny then breeds the germ of its own destruction the moment it makes its 
appearance because it is unable to sustain the power to remain in the public 
space of appearance.12 
Power is therefore fundamentally wanting to act and to live together 
and thus does not have to be forced to submit to ethical precepts.  It is part of 
the ethical aim to live a good life with others in just institutions.  This brings 
justice into the picture, and it has two faces: the ‘good’ that extends 
interpersonal relations to institutions, and the ‘legal’ whereby the judicial 
system gives law coherence and society, constraint.13 
                                                 
9 Ricouer, The Just, 5. 
10 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1958), 199. 
11 Ibid., 200. 
12 Ibid., 202. 
13 Ricouer, Oneself as Another, 197.  
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Power from this perspective is the guarantor of right, not principally in 
the sense than an armed sector of society polices against violators of right, but 
in the sense that what allows for justice—the extension of the interpersonal to 
institutions and the coherence and restraint of legal systems (including 
constraints to legal behavior and restraints against violations of rights)—is the 
will to live together, action or power in common.  The ‘will to live together’ 
must also be an elemental form of responsibility, but this cannot be other than 
a dimension of the ethical aim of living a good life with others in just 
institutions. 
 
Habermas 
 
  Law plays today the role of archaic institutions and a seamless, 
undisturbed, uncolonized life-world in the past.  Archaic institutions are just 
that—surpassed by the post-conventional, and the life-world is increasingly 
rationalized and therefore subject to the ravages of unrelenting pluralism.  But 
with law and its role of lending society coherence and stabilizing behavior 
expectations, there arises the tension of its facticity—want it or not, it is there, 
it is a social fact—and its validity—whether or not in commands obedience 
and allegiance, whether or not it justifies the employment of the coercive 
power of the State. 
Legitimate law and coercion can co-exist without antagonism for 
Habermas, but this can be so only if legal coercion does not destroy the 
rational motive for obeying the law.  While unanimity is not demanded, what 
must at all times be possible is for all those affected by the law “to grasp the 
point,” to obey on the basis of insight, on the basis of rational grounds.   
Precisely because law must leave addressees free to accept or to contest, then it 
must also leave them free to take the posture of “objectivation”: I really do not 
care much about the law, but it is better to comply than to be penalized.14 
The basic rights that Habermas identifies are not rights against the 
State as such bu more fundamentally consequences of the discourse principle: 
allowing only such actions norms to count as valid as can meet with the 
approval of all potentially affected participating as consociates in rational 
discourse.  That there will be, unfortunately, members of society who refuse to 
accept rational argument, who employ strategic force in place of participating 
the public sphere of opinion and will-formation is the very reason that the 
State must wield coercive power.  The basic rights of which Habermas rights 
regulate the relations among freely associated citizens and are therefore prior to 
any legally organized state authority against whose encroachments citizens may 
claim rights.  With the right to participate in those processes by which 
legitimate law is generated, citizens become authors of the law.15 
                                                 
14 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
(Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), 120-121. 
15 Ibid., 123.  
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As legal subjects, persons are given a code within which their 
autonomy is to be actualized.  Human autonomy is autonomy within the space 
of law.  Persons therefore understand themselves as authors of the very rights 
to which they all submit, but all this within the context of self-legislation that 
occurs within—not outside—the medium of law itself.  It is persons who 
debate that which legislatures codify as legal rights.  More than this, citizens 
can determine for themselves whether the laws they pass are legitimate through 
the freedom to participate in basic political processes that form the legislators’ 
will and opinion. 
The right of equal participation results from the juridification of the 
communicative freedom of all citizens.  Communicative freedom is the power 
of unrestrained communication, exchange and will formation to generate 
rationally motivated consensus.  Seen this way, popular sovereignty and human 
rights go hand in hand, and civic and private autonomy are co-original.16 
But Habermas has grander plan: the reconstruction of law by which he 
means discovering the conditions under which modern legal and political 
orders count as legitimate. 
The abstract rights of persons become concrete and enforceable 
through democratic and discursive law making.  The power of the law is 
essentially the power of rationally motivated consensus, and therefore 
ultimately ,the power of communicative action that Habermas contrasts starkly 
with the strategic use of power.  In his reconstructive theory, Habermas first 
develops a theory of a system of rights, and then articulates the principles of 
the constitutional state, by which these rights are secured through law.17 
This is one level of the encounter between power and rights.  On this 
level, one calls on communicative power that is juris-generative to translate the 
realm of abstract rights into a regime of legally enforceable rights.  It also 
becomes apparent that the most elemental right is the right to participate as 
consociate in discourse that generates law, that communicative action that later 
on becomes structured—vertically—as legislative discourse.  Rights and 
democracy are therefore co-equal in the idea of legitimate law. 
As for the constitutional state, a central principle of constitutionalism 
the reciprocal link between law and political power.  This is a second-level 
encounter with power.  Institutions for applying law are state-organized and 
the legal decisions of such institution are enforced through coercive state-
power.  From one side, political power is legitimate only when exercised in 
legal form and according to legal procedures.  In this sense, law legitimates the 
exercise of political power.  Law and political power therefore presuppose each 
other.  But for law-making to be democratic, something else is necessary and 
for this Habermas enunciates the discourse principle.  Applied to the 
engenderment of law, it is the democratic principle and it demands that ‘only 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 127. 
17 Hugh Baxter, “System and Lifeworld in Habermas’ Theory of Law”, Cardozo Law 
Review 23:2 (2002), 477-615 at 483.  
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those laws may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a 
discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.’   
Some have despaired, without reason to my mind, over what they 
perceive to be the impossibly stringent demands of this principle.  I do not 
read it as requiring the impossible.  In the first place, it does not require 
unanimity.  It merely requires that the legislature be prepared with such 
arguments for the law as may meet with the rationally motivated acceptance of 
reasonable persons.  Second, it does not require that all citizens legislate.  It 
only requires that the will formation of citizens be taken up by the discursive 
process of legislation that is itself legitimately constituted. 
Responsibility and communicative power demand each other.   
Communicative power is that power that responsible consociates wield by 
communication that ensures that all relevant questions, issues and 
contributions are brought up and processed in discourses and negotiations on 
the basis of the best available information and argument.18  This entails the 
responsibility to advance arguments, the responsibility to raise crucial and 
critical questions and the responsibility to yield to the force of the better 
argument. 
There is, therefore, much to commend in what Habermas calls in 
another work “the moral principle” which is actually the articulation of a form 
of responsibility—an elemental form.  Each participant to practical discourse 
must transfer his subjective desires into generalizable desires.  Precisely because 
Habermas insists that all claims must be redeemed by the responsible speaker 
or actor, then in a sense even this requirement is superfluous because only such 
claims are within redemption that advance generalizable interests with which 
consociates can identify.  In fact the basic responsibility is the responsibility to 
justify and to redeem one’s claims in terms and arguments comprehensible to 
all possibly affected.19 
 
Graduate School of Law, San Beda College, Philippines 
Department of Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Philippine Judicial Academy, 
Supreme Court of the Philippines, Philippines 
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